Abduction-Induction-Deduction (AID)We write about AID (Boje & Rosile, 2020) as a way to do self-correcting in conversational storytelling. The latest in AID, and there is much that is happening (Sætre & Van de Ven, 2021; Zellweger & Zenger, 2021).  Abductive hunches are part of what E1 is about, bringing in thinking back into managing and organizing, what we in 'true storytelling' (Larsen, Boje, & Bruun, 2021) call embodied reflection, telling a story, not a fake story that does "not aim at knowledge, at belief about facts or in truths" (Dewey, 1910: 3), rather to apply the entire triadic of AID to correcting a well-constructed plot, or a good story with a clear climax, rather an inquiry that is about the essence of what's true. 

AID triad see Boje and Rosile 2020 for more on this
Figure: Relational Process Ontologies in AID iterative cycles of conversational storytelling inquiry (see Boje, in press book on Pondy)

Heidegger (1954) asks What Is Called Thinking?'.  His answer: it's not opinion, not the fact-checking, not making a correct statement, bur rather freedom to give an accounting in the open region. Like Pondy, Heidegger asks, what are we not thinking that we need to be thinking about in our Being-in-the-world.  Peirce proposes four kinds of tests of induction: reflective thought, talk to or interview someone with different thoughts, explore other science paradigms than your own, or if you can afford it do actual experiments. This is a process of self-correcting your abductive hunches, deductive theories, and your inductive testing, so you come closer, and closer, by iteration to understanding what's true.  It involves not just the usual process of verification of your thinking (E1) or your sensemaking enactment (E2), it is about interactively doing cycles of AID, coming up with better assumptions, refining it, and in more and more cases, until you are reasonably confident there are no more black swans out there. 

The problem of making inferences from inductive inquiry is how to do more than "Crude Induction" (Peirce 6.473).  To do other than crude induction by association thinking, by metaphor thinking, by analogy thinking, or by studying a few non-randomly drawn cases, and extrapolating an inference to the entire population means moving past crude induction to the qualitative and the quantitative inductions. This is a kind of reasoning that does not let induction go forth without deduction and abduction. In short, crude induction claims certainty of what's true, prematurely without taking the inductive fallacy into account of making a story of a case into the story of a population. We therefore do A-I-D iteratively, longitudinally, to uncover a closer and closer approximation of what's true. In this ways we can become more and more "attuned to the truth of things in order to discover.." the continuity of qualities in-Time and the "errors" we "have fallen into" in our thinking (Peirce, 6.476; 6.6).

What’s Enthinkment, when you consider Pondy as pragmatist, or doing not just Dewey (1910) How to Think or James (1907) Pragmatism, but what Peirce calls 'pragmaticism'?  What's the difference?  Early Peirce (1868) held that pragmatism insists abstractions give an account in terms of practical experience.  Later, Peirce, he want to think beyond qualities of sensation of empirical psychology to the intellectual meanings, and in pragmaticism, get to something embodied in a wide variety of 'existents' (Vol. 3, 433) not just William James' (1907) which Peirce called 'radical empiricism', but also Schiller (Vol. 5, Book II, para 414, p. 276), and to something to do with ethics (129ff, 533), and to inscription of 'purposive' habits to nature (107, 603). Peirce (Vol. 5, Book II, para 414, pp. 276-277) defines "The birth of the word 'pragmaticism,' which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers." He is taking a direction that does not stop with "the first impressions of sense" or of "cognitive elaboration" because there are multiple states of mind already formed, and asks Mr. Make Believe" "What! Do you mean to say that one is to believe what is not true, or that what a man does not doubt is ipso facto true?" (Vol. 5, Book II, para 416, p. 278). In other words 'pragmaticism' is what's untrue (due to fallibility, 'which Ockham's razor would clean shave off) and what's true in habit of mind meets up with 'some surprise' that supersedes habits of consciousness, and "exert a measure of self-control over ... future actions" (Vol. 5, Book II, para 418, p. 279). In other words "ethical self-control" (419, p. 280). In Boje and Rosile (2020) we call this self-correcting abduction and/or deduction by doing inductive tests (self-reflection, interview others, study other paradigms of explanation, or do experiment/intervention).  "When one reasons, it is that critical self that one is trying to persuade" (Vol. 5, Book II, para 421, p. 281). What is pragmaticism of self-correction:


"Everything that might give a dramatic illusion must be stripped off, so that the result will be a sort of cross between a dialogue and a catechism, but a good deal liker the latter -- something rather painfully reminiscent of Mangnall's Historical Questions." (Vol. 5, Book II, para 422, p. 281). 


In short, every proposition of ontological metaphysics by doing a series of tests of abductive and deductive assumptions.  In short, not doing a single test, but a series of them. "... if pragmaticism really made Doing to be the Be all and the End-all of life, that would be its death"
(Vol. 5, Book II, para 429, p. 286) 'Whatever exists, ex-ists, that is, really acts upon other existents, so obtains a self-identity, and is definitely individual... the noun is not an existent thing; it be spoken or written..." (IBID. p. 287). In short, Peirce pragmaticism is not just about action it is about what exist, and what is ethical reason toward changing a habit of thinking and/or a habit of action, or a fixation of opinions.

"That which any true proposition asserts is ral, in the sense of being as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it... Accordingly, the pragmaticist does not make summum bonum to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable ... but only the practical attitude of the thinker toward the two is different" (Vol. 5, Book II, para 432-434, p. 290).  Peirce said Hegel degraded what is thinking (p. 291).


 
What is Time?  A Charles Sanders Peirce Pragmaticism Answer


Charles Sanders Pierce put Thirdness as an Existential Mode of Time in relation to Firstness and Secondness (Vol. V1, #32, p. 25).  This triadic is the basis of how his pragmaticism differs from other pragmatisms, such as that of William James, that grounded a phenomenology of experience in social psychology.  Our Enthinkment Circle is exploring different theories of time in the work of Charles Sanders Peirce.  The figures in the image are E1 (Pondy), E2 (Weick), and QS (Peirce), in Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness Triadic. Peirce asks "What is Time?" then a much humbler question "What is meant by Time?" (Vol. V #458, p. 310).

References to the Past, Present, Future is irresistible. Each has lots of fallibility to consider. A linear sequence of events past that was, present now happening, and future not yet is according to Peirce not the only way of considering 'what is meant by Time?


WHAT IS PAST? Peirce defines time-past as "a fait accompli... accomplishment is the Existential Mode of Time" (Vol. 5, #459, p. 311).   Call this the Secondness of enactment of Weickian retrospective sensemaking narrative that selects a few events to order in beginning, middle, and end linear sequence, out of the flow of time that is otherwise continuous enactment. A problem is our memory of the past is fallible. We forget stuff, and try to remember by paying attention to what was, and is now forgotten. We call these 'little wow moments' we might recover from the Before, in the true storytelling approach (Larsen, Boje, & Bruun, 2021) or 'restorying by embodied reflection (Boje & Rosile, 2020). Since historical narratives can be shallow, Heidegger advocates digging out deeper histories.  


What is Present? This is not the Thirdness of Peirce's pragmaticism approach to the question of Time. Peirce seeks an alternative to the Now approach to the 'living present' He asks how does the Present bear on conduct? (V, #462). His answer "Introspection is wholly a matter of inference" (p. 313). There is no ego and "the self is only inferred" (p. 313).  Present has either construed or perception, the former is attitude and the later is illusion in "Nascent State of the Actual" (IBID.).  Peirce focuses on what is becoming in the Present. Peirce concludes "There is only one Time: however "Time is compared with it truth for space" , than challenges, "But we must go further:(V, #463, p. 313). "I do not think that man can consistently hold that there is room in time for an event between the two events separate in time" (V, #2111, p. 129). 

WHAT IS FUTURE? Peirce says nothing of the sort of a fait accompli is true in Past, of the Future (p. 311). Call this the Firstness, of enthinkment inference. This is more about prospective antenarrative process, 'bets on the future' (Boje, 2001).  In making bets on the future, that process is about inferences of 'opportune moments' to make something happen. To make an antenarrative bet (Boje, 2001).  We make inferences, or bets, but these are abductive hunches, intuitions, wild guesses, all in need of inductive testing of both abductions and deductive theory.  "Pragmatism, the conclusion of a Reasoning power must refer to the Future" (Peirce, V, # 461, p. 313).
 

What is Thirdness? Peirce says Thirdness is Metaphysics  of Time. We look to Quantum Storytelling (QS) in Peirce's writings.  "Is Time a real thin, or if not, what is the nature of the reality that it represents?" (VI, #6, p. 6). In quantum sense "time, space, matter, force, gravitation, electricity, ect: (VI, #34, p. 27).  After deconstructing the limits of causality in Newtonian physics, Peirce turns to how the psychical world is different from the physical world of force.  Newton had three laws of cause and effect, here summarized:

1. The state of things at any one instance of time is completed and exactly determing by the state of things at one other instant of time
2. The cause of the state of things precedes the effect of things.
3. No fact determines a fact preceding it in time.


With regard to Future, Past, and Present:


"Each state of mind, acting under an overruling association, produces another state of mind. Or if different states of mind contribute to producing another, they simply act concurrently, and not in opposite ways, as the two earlier positions of a particle of matter do, in determining a third position ... furthermore, the relations of the present to the past and to the future, instead of being the same, as in the domain of the Law of Energy, are utterly unlike. I remember the past, but I have absolutely no slightest approach to such knowledge of the future. On the other hand I have considerable power i over the future, but nobody except the Parisian mob imagines that he can change the past by much or by little" (VI, #70, p. 50).  Peirce is aware of Einstein theory of time relativity, and of Newton's causal laws. For Thirdness, Peirce takes a metaphysics standpoint, however, he also uses AID (abduction, induction, deduction) because he is humble about his own fallibility.


Our own interpretation of Little Buddha and CS Peirce 3
      notions of evolution time


Peirce's three time evolution theories: Tychastic evolution, Anancastic evolution, and Agapistic Evolution (in Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness), allows for Creative Love of the Agape in relation to the Jeremy Bentham (utilitarianism) and Darwin (selection of fittest variations) Tychastic, and in relation to the Anancastic evolution he reads in Creative Love (Agape). In Volume VII, a whole book on Love, going through scriptures, and various interpretations, and centering his own. Peirce's theory of Creative Love (embodied spirituality) is not hampered by Cartesian, Kantian, Newtonian, but ventures into what we now call quantum storytelling, in VII on the Metaphysics of all this (Chapter 2, Evolutionary Love). Peirce comes up with Thirdness as a way to inquiry into processes where cause-effect fails to go (e.g. variation-selection-retention notions of time; VI, #69 & #202, for more).

 
A Little Buddha Version of 4 Whos and 7 antenarrative
        processes

Appliying firstness secondness and thirdness
                      of Peirce to Pondy and Weick

A Little Buddha Version of 4 Whos and 7 antenarrative
        processes

For more on the 7 antenarrative processes, please see Antenarrative.com


How does all this apply to the 'who' question: who is storytelling to whom? In TS we look at the interplay of four who's:
1) Ego-centric-who Peirce calls 'self-love', which as you know is the basis of most economic theory, that self-greed is efficient market mechanism (or invisible hand).
2) Corporate-centric-who Peirce calls love of a limited class (one class of people, against another class of people), devoted to corporate wealth of shareholders, utilitarianism, survival of the fittest variation approach to entrepreneurship, and so on, rather than to good, just, and betterment of the whole of the social or to ecological;
3) We-centric-who (or social) that is what Peirce calls a 'public-spirit; consciousness, Heidegger calls the 'they-self), that puts the social ahead of Nature, and sometimes ahead of Corporate-who.
4) Eco-centric-who of ecology, which is quite divided over issue of spirituality of nature or nature as just spiritless processes.


We get the four-whos into dialogues of true storytelling. For more see
True Storytelling Institute
And we help people think and make sense of what's true of an ethical life. And no one we know had more honesty, integrity to walk that talk than Louis Ralph Pondy. Peirce and Pondy were rigorous and creative thinkers. Peirce 'post hoc ergo propter hoc' fallacy (Latin for post hoc), thinking (VII, #114, p. 67) is understood as a process of induction-fallacy, from antecedent to conclusion with but one or a few case. Example, "Every swan I see is white, therefore all swans are white" (then the case of the black swan); "Every time that rooster crows, the sun comes up"; "A black cat crossed my path, and then I got into a car accident"; "Yesterday I did an elevator pitch, today everyone understand me." A well conducted inquiry is not just post hoc. In Abduction-Induction-Deduction (AID), it's about more cases and better thinking, to get to better understanding.